Representations, judgments, and the swamping problem for reliabilism: why the problem applies to process reliabilism, but not to virtue reliabilism

This article argues for a way out of the swamping problem by showing where his virtue epistemology substantially departs from traditional process reliabilism and how such departure is enough to protect the former from issues that affect the way the latter accounts for the value of knowledge over mere true belief

Dreams and Skeptics

This paper compares the relative merits of perceptual beliefs and introspective beliefs in the context of dream arguments for skepticism. It is argued that introspective beliefs are not epistemically privileged over perceptual beliefs

Contextualismo y escepticismo

Contextualism has gained center stage in epistemology mainly through its way with the skeptic, from the early days of "relevant alternatives" to important recent publications. Although the author himself accepts elements of contextualism, this article details reservations about its use in epistemology, and in particular, about its use to dispose skepticism

Obedience

No abstract

AGÊNCIA EPISTÊMICA

O texto explora uma série de distinções entre estados mentais que podem ser cognitivamente relevantes, bem como entre aqueles que podem ser “autoapresentantes”, a fim de analisar as relações entre eles e o mundo exterior e compreender os tipos de crenças e juízos epistêmicos que podem ensejar. Busca, ainda, reconsiderar o estatuto (porventura epistêmico) de experiências sensórias com conteúdo. O objetivo desse percurso é fazer frente a objeções céticas à justificação epistêmica do tipo daquelas levantadas pelo trilema de Agripa, segundo o qual a avaliação reflexiva não pode regredir infinitamente, circular infinitamente, nem depender de alguma instância arbitrária. Trata-se, também, finalmente, de esclarecer, com as nuances relevantes, a relação entre juízo e liberdade – esclarecimento relevante para a análise mais geral da agência epistêmica. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Juízo. Agência epistêmica. Liberdade. Conhecimento. Trilema de Agripa. EPISTEMIC AGENCY Ernest Sosa The paper explores a series of distinctions between mental states that might be cognitively relevant, as well as between those that might be “self-presenting”, so as to analyze the relations between these and the external world, and understand the types of beliefs and epistemic judgments for which they allow. The paper also aims to reconsider the (perhaps epistemic) status of contentful sensory experiences. The goal of the journey is to face skeptical objections to epistemic justification akin to those raised by the Agrippan trilemma, according to which reflexive evaluation cannot regress infinitely, be infinitely circular, nor depend upon some arbitrary instance. It is also question of clarifying, with the relevant nuances, the relation between judgment and freedom – a clarification that is of import to the more general question of epistemic agency. KEY-WORDS: Judgment. Epistemic agency. Freedom. Knowledge. Agrippan trilemma. AGENCE ÉPISTÉMIQUE Ernest Sosa Le texte explore toute une série de distinctions entre des états mentaux qui sont ou non cognitivement pertinents, ou qui sont aussi ou non “auto-présentants”, comme manière d’analyser les relations entre ceux-ci et le monde extérieur, et de comprendre les types de croyances et de jugements épistémiques qu’ils peuvent faire surgir. Notre étude cherche également à reconsidérer le statut (peut-être épistémique) d’expériences sensorielles ayant un contenu. L’objectif de ce parcours est de faire face aux objections septiques quant à la justification épistémique de celles soulevées par le trilemme d’Agrippa selon lequel l’évaluation réflexive ne peut régresser indéfiniment, circuler indéfiniment ni dépendre d’une quelconque instance arbitraire. Il s’agit aussi, finalement, d’éclaircir avec des nuances la relation entre jugement et liberté – éclairage significatif pour l’analyse plus générale de l’agence épistémique. MOTS-CLÉS: Jugement. Agence Epistémique. Liberté. Connaissance. Trilemme d’Agrippa. Publicação Online do Caderno CRH no Scielo: http://www.scielo.br/ccrh  Publicação Online do Caderno CRH: http://www.cadernocrh.ufba.b

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